Along with the evolution of Internet and its new emerging services, the quantity and impact of attacks have been continuously increasing. Currently, the technical capability to attack has tended to decrease. On the contrary, performances of hacking tools are evolving, growing, simple, comprehensive, and accessible to the public. In this work, network penetration testing and auditing of the Redhat operating system (OS) are highlighted as one of the most popular OS for Internet applications. Some types of attacks are from a different side and new attack method have been attempted, such as: scanning for reconnaissance, guessing the password, gaining privileged access, and flooding the victim machine to decrease availability. Some analyses in network auditing and forensic from victim server are also presented in this paper. Our proposed system aims confirmed as hackable or not and we expect for it to be used as a reference for practitioners to protect their systems from cyber-attacks.
Introduction
In earlier work performed by [1] they categorized some types of cyber hacking and described how to manage information of vulnerability and raised awareness about the importance of these issues. This current type of cyber-attack highlighted by [2] and [3] was analyzed and it became the main focus in network security. They created expression, "the dark side of the Internet" and identified threats that can occur and the challenge to solve. This is also corroborated and predicted by [4] , who presented the future war in the cyber weapon and its effect. According to [5] and [6] attackers launch their actions inseperably and the steps they used to gain user privilege is called 'attack taxonomy,' which is based on differentiation scenarios. This work presents penetration testing to evaluate security flaws in Redhat operating system. On other hand, every bug has the potential to become vulnerable. It was made, exist and patching, often without ever being discovered or exploited. From the attacker's perspective, vulnerability is an opportunity to exploit. However, from the developer's perspective, the software/product containing an unknown vulnerability was created. It requires time to make a patch release after the exploitation is found. The consequence is that there is a time delay between an exploit 2. Collasoft tools [14] and Cascade pilot software [15] 
Penetration Testing
In this experiment, all attacks were executed and infiltrated on ITD UTM. A detailed analysis on a Redhat operating system was provided in this phase to run reconnaissance and map resources for applications or default configurations that look like they have security risks. This stage is divided into five steps in this stage: Scanning, Password Guessing, Escalating Privilege, Implant Malware, and Flooding attack.
Scanning
Step 1, scanning stages are explained below (see Fig. 1 ).
1. Attacker probes the network 10. Some potential vulnerabilities to exploit were found after some of the scenarios listed above were executed. Therefore, there are correlations between vulnerabilities from the scanning stages and CVE database, which are as follows:
1. Highlighted Apache vulnerability, related between mark ○ 3 and ○ 9 in Fig 
Password Guessing
In this stage password guessing was attempted for getting access to the target. The following scenarios were used:
1. Attacker attempts XSS to HTTP via port 80 2. Attacker attempts password guessing repeatedly to the 10.10.10.5 via SSH brute-force and Telnet 3. Attacker used some dictionary attack to guessing the password 4. If Attacker find the access user, then their login to SSH via putty shell 5. Attacker try to login via WinSCP Software
Password Guessing was conducted in this scenario. The Hacker BT attempted to exploit the SSH Vulnerability uses Hydra, SSHatter, BruteSSH, and Medusa. Information was obtained from Nmap and other scanning tools, SSH, Telnet and netbios are daemon active and running well in target. From the attacker's side, the first concern as a target is SSH and attempt to guessing based on dictionary attack. Unfortunately, with a standard Linux configuration, username and password cannot be retrieved after three attempts, the message is "3 incorrect password attempts" (Refer to Stage 7 below in the points listed under "Escalating Privileges"). From the experiment that was carried out simultaneously and online, it is observed that the admin, root, and administrator were some of the users who tried to existing dictionary. Obviously, the duration of the experiment depends on the length of the password list in a dictionary and also its performance and availability target server will be tested, due to the continuously ongoing handshake process.
In this case, some brute-force methods were used, as shown in Fig. 3(a) mark ○ 1 result from hydra tools to attempt telnet authentication, medusa show in ○ 2 trying guessing password and failed, then attackers successfully found the root password via bruteSSH shown in mark ○ 3 . From several experiment conducted, the attacker gets a failure attempt to guess the password. There were a number of alerts produced by Snort, inform threat shown in Table 2 Unfortunately, snort cannot identify all the threats.
Escalating Privileges
The attacker found several potential penetration, such as: Port 21 (FTP), 22 (SSH), 80 (HTTP), 111 (RPCbin) and 3306 (MySQL). In this step gaining access as a super user (root/admin) was conducted by attacker. The scenario is further illustrated below: 
Implant Malware
In this step, Hacker BT and Hacker XP attempted to Implant Malware onto target, tried to infect it with malware and implant the rootkit, as follows:
1. Attacker regained access, identified system more closely and seeked exploit 2. Hacker XP 10.10.10.15 attempts to ARP Poison via Cain&Abel and failed 3. Hacker BT 10.10.10.20 attempts to MySQL exploit via metasploit and did not work msf > use auxiliary/admin/mysql/mysql_enum msf auxiliary(mysql_enum) > set RHOST 10.10.10.5 4. Hacker XP attempted via Netcat to create Backdoor, which unfortunately failed. Attacker plan to access subsequent entry after the system full controlled to facilitate their re-enter without suspicion afterward.
Flooding
The final penetration testing was to flood the Denial of Services (DoS). The attackers attempted within hours to disrupt the normal functioning then effect to availability the target and they succeeded. This action compiled and visualized in Figure 6 (b), the ICMP packet was dominant and some alert trigger from this action are shows in Table 4 . 
Network Auditing
Penetration to this victim was analyzed and several review presented. The sample Log from the Redhat server is presented in this section. Several illegal attempts from log directory "var/log/messages" and "var/log/secure" are shown below (taken from Figs. 4 and 5 ).
1. Machine attacker (10.10.10.15) confirm daemon version of OpenSSH as shown in Fig. 4(a) . The system informed failed to login and showed illegal user from source. Xinetd heard all of the service ports for the services listed in its configuration file and informed the attacker via 10.10.10.20, which repeatedly tried to penetrate Port 23, as shown in Fig. 4(c) . Xinetd heard the incoming requests and launched the appropriate service from 10.10.10.20. Meanwhile, item (a) and (d) confirmed the unsuccessful penetration of password for user 'admin'. In Fig. 4(d) a partial history log from brute-force via attempts of medusa and Hydra is shown. Penetration passwords that SSH and Telnet conducted during this experiment from beginning to end are compiled and visualized shown in Fig. 6(b) below. 2. The penetration by attacker conducted is shown in Figure 3 
Result and Analysis
Real traffic was sniffed out by TCPdump to produce a pcap file. Therefore, Snort was used to identify malicious traffic and threats. It produced a lot of alerts in the log directory of the "/var/log/snort" directory. From the probe stages, Snort was able to produce 248,376 lines of information about threats and 722,845 lines in penetration stages. Tables 1-4 show the number of alerts from each attack scenario that was conducted, with the exception of false alarms.
The number of rows generated are due to repetition of the same information by Snort [16] , which can be simplified by initializing the signature-id and priority. It was observed that each alert had taxonomy content (signature-id, priority, src_ip, src_port, dst_ip, dst_port, time stamp, TTL, ToS, IP_Len, and Dgm_Len). Furthermore, to sort and combine it automatically we used our approach to categorize the same information based on signature-id and the priority of each alert.
The outcome discussion of this process is that Red Hat can be exploited and is possible to penetrate, while Snort could not identify all of the attack we conducted. It was only able to recognize an attack based on signatures without being able to take active response. Therefore, Snort should be combined with other defense systems. This allows it to become a powerful detection engine. Snort can perform protocol analysis, content matching, can be configured as a sniffer, packet logger, and have a large community for sharing and update information. 
Conclusion and Future Works
This work presents the comprehensive network auditing risk analysis for awareness about security violations. It resulted in several issues as some attack scenarios could not be properly recognized, raise awareness cyber security especially variety of Internet threats and penetration testing is necessary to confirm our system are hackable or not. Furthermore, it can be argued that there are significant gaps in the Redhat operating system, such as every daemon and application running on it effects the balance between its security level and management system, that the number of vulnerabilities can be exploited, and that Redhat has a default self-defense system against validation attacks. We recognize that there are some problems that need to be solved in future works, such as how to extract the features for classifying between an attack and normal traffic from offline or online, how to visualize an alert to show details of taxonomy information from Snort, and how to combine the features of Snort and a firewall for a unified threat prevention approach.
